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95 
MANUFACTURING PEACE: THE DIPLOMATIC IMPACT AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONES IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 
INTRODUCTION 
Armed conflict and political unrest in the Middle East has been a 
persistent concern of leading world nations for the last several decades. 
The international response to such conflict has varied. At times, as with 
the Gulf War, armed conflict has been met with armed response. Howev-
er, nations should generally attempt to lean towards more diplomatic 
measures, particularly when a nation is involved as a quasi-mediator 
between warring States. As the world trade market has become increas-
ingly globalized, the likelihood of international trade interests becoming 
intertwined with regional conflict has similarly increased. Nations look-
ing to continue or establish investment in foreign nations may have to 
maneuver or attempt to cooperate with politically unstable countries to 
help build their trade capacity.  
The United States has had a long standing diplomatic and trade rela-
tionship with Israel and was the first to recognize Israel as a State in 
1948.1 The two countries have had a free trade agreement since 1985 and 
the United States remains Israel’s largest trade partner.2 Accordingly, the 
United States has a vested interest in the diplomatic relations Israel has 
with countries in its region. This paper concerns United States involve-
ment in Israel’s relationship with two Israeli neighbors, Jordan and 
Egypt. In particular, this paper will look at the establishment of Qualify-
ing Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan and Egypt and attempt to assess the 
impact these zones have had on the promotion of bilateral and regional 
peace.  
QIZs are a type of multilateral trade agreement that creates free 
trade zones in Jordan and Egypt where these countries manufacture 
products for tariff-free export to the United States.3 Israel and these two 
countries established QIZs with economic incentives in mind, but also 
with the express motive of solidifying peaceful relations between Israel 
and the two nations.4 This paper will first discuss how international 
  
 1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Mary Jane Bolle, Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) in Jordan and Egypt: Background 
Issues  
for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 4 (2013). 
 4. Matthias Busse and Steffen Groning, Assessing the Impact of Trade Liberation: The Case 
of Jordan, J. OF ECON. INTEGRATION 466, 469 (2012). 
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commerce can be used to promote peace. It will then provide an over-
view of QIZs and the possible motives for the development of the zones. 
Next, the paper will analyze whether this unique peace-building strategy 
has had a positive impact on sustainable economic development and re-
gional peace in Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. Finally, the paper will discuss 
whether QIZs have promise as tools for achieving political and economic 
stabilization in regions suffering from diplomatic or violent conflict.  
Choosing Commerce over Force for Conflict Control 
The United States has been both praised and chastised for its in-
volvement in international peacekeeping. In the last few decades, United 
States activity in the Middle East has been a point of particular conten-
tion.5 Notably, some critics of this activity have argued that United States 
presence in the Middle East has acted as a catalyst for conflict, fueling 
the movements and violent impacts of extremist or terrorist groups.6 
Nonetheless, economic deficiencies have been cited as “[t]he main 
source of political destabilization in the Middle East.”7 It is pertinent, 
then, to consider how the United States should approach new commerce 
agendas in the region without sparking further disapproval or spite.  
There are strong arguments supporting the notion that building trade 
relations can produce significant peace dividends. This is largely based 
on the concept that, when a country’s potential for trade expands, its po-
tential to provide better livelihoods to its nationals also expands.8 Trade 
agreements may involve an influx of goods that were not previously 
available in a country.9 Unfortunately, when foreign markets invade do-
mestic ones by means of trade, this may also stunt the domestic econo-
my’s ability to grow through local competition.10 Trade agreements may 
also tackle unemployment issues by providing a source of jobs to facili-
tate the process of international commerce.11 As links have been drawn 
between unemployment problems and political destabilization, the crea-
tion of jobs is an essential aspect of trade expansion that seeks to benefit 
peace.12 
  
 5. Mohamed R. Hassanien, International Law Fights Terrorism in the Muslim World: A 
Middle Eastern Perspective, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 226 (2007–08). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Roni N. Halabi, Stability in the Middle East Through Economic Development: An Analy-
sis of the Peace Process, Increased Agricultural Trade, Joint Ventures, and Free Trade Agreements, 
2 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 275, 282 (1997). 
 8. Chang-fa Lo, Plurilateral FTAs to Enhance Human Rights Protection in Asia, 8 ASIAN J. 
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 605, 609 (2013). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Taleb Awad and Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, Impact of Qualifying Industrial Zones on 
Egypt and Jordan: A Critical Analysis, UNCTAD, 26 (2008), available at 
http://vi.unctad.org/resources-mainmenu-64/digital-library?task=dl_doc&doc_name=329_qiz_egyp. 
 11. Lo, supra note 8, at 609. 
 12. Halabi, supra note 7, at 283. 
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Trade agreements may also play an important role in the promotion 
of sustainable development. Sustainable development, as it has been tra-
ditionally defined, is “development which meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”13 Notably, alongside social equity and environmental protection, 
economic development is one of the three pillars of sustainable develop-
ment.14 The economic development pillar reflects the key benefits of 
improved trade relations, discussed above, including job creation and 
advancing State capacity to provide a variety of goods and services to its 
nationals. However, this must be observed with the caveat that increased 
economic development may lead to the increased and often damaging 
exploitation of natural resources, necessitating a search for balance 
among the sustainable development pillars.15 As countries build citizen 
wealth through international commerce, the demand for stricter environ-
mental and social standards should similarly grow.16 Unfortunately, 
commercial growth may also increase a country’s output of waste and 
pollution resulting in environmental degradation that often most severely 
impacts poor communities in those countries.17 Increased trade brings 
with it the fear of a “race to the bottom” where developers of trade seek 
to set up camp in countries with the weakest environmental regulations.18 
Therefore, to ensure that trade programs benefit sustainable develop-
ment, countries must consciously curb trade liberalization and develop-
ment to disallow the economic development pillar from outplaying its 
neighboring pillars.19  
Developed countries engaged in establishing free trade agreements 
or zones with other countries should be wary of the potential negative 
impacts of these agreements. While providing significant trade opportu-
nities for developing nations, free trade agreements may also increase the 
risk of the human rights violations.20 The cheap labor often associated 
with the development of free trade zones may tempt host nations or cor-
porations to disregard the basic needs of the workers supporting newly 
formed trade partnerships.21 The recent human rights violations cropping 
  
 13. John Drexhage and Deborah Murphy, Sustainable Development: From Brundtland to Rio 
2012, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2 (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/gsp/docs/GSP1-
6_Background%20on%20Sustainable%20Devt.pdf. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Patrick Reynaud, Sustainable Development and Regional Trade Agreements: Toward 
Better Practices in Impact Assessments, 8 McGill Int’l J. Sust. Dev. L & Pol’y 205, 211 (2012). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id at 211-12. 
 19. Drexhage, supra note 13, at 6. 
 20. Anal A. Kandeel, The US-Market-Oriented Qualifying Industrial Zones: Economic Reali-
ties and Scope of Benefits, ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY 25, 29 (2008). 
 21. Id. 
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up in the Cambodian apparel industry exemplify this.22 Women manufac-
turing apparel for export have been subjected to sexual harassment, 
forced overtime work without pay, and wrongful termination when as-
serting their workplace health concerns.23 Because workers in these types 
of industries are often taken advantage of for the sake of profits, both 
nations engaging in a trade agreement should work to ensure that human 
rights are bolstered by the trade partnership rather than violated.  
The Role of Regionalism Promoting Peace in the Middle East 
The United States has initiated various trade programs in the Middle 
East, occurring primarily after the September 11 attacks.24 The incorpo-
ration of a new trade regime in the Middle East is a testament to the idea 
that regional economic development is a preferable diplomatic alterna-
tive to the use of force to fight conflict and terrorism.25 One example of 
such a program is the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative 
(MEFTA).26 Proposed by President Bush is 2003, MEFTA was a pro-
gram designed to encourage the development of Free Trade Areas 
(FTAs) and other bilateral trade agreements between the United States 
and Arab nations.27 Unlike the QIZ program, the Bush administration 
specifically designed MEFTA to target terrorism and enhance national 
security through trade.28 Thus far, MEFTA has led to the establishment 
of FTAs between the United States and three Arab nations: Bahrain, 
Oman, and Morocco.29 The United States had previously established 
FTAs with Israel and Jordan.30 The FTAs established under MEFTA do 
not represent a significant economic boost for the United States, the rep-
resented countries being relatively small players in international trade.31 
It is debatable whether these partnerships still benefit the intentions of 
MEFTA, despite their relative economic insignificance. The program has 
yet to aid in the establishment of FTAs with bigger market players like 
Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.32 However, significantly, MEFTA 
represented the United States’ first attempt to expand economically 
themed diplomacy in the Middle East beyond its activities that were pre-
viously limited to conflicts concerning Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and Iran.33 
  
 22. Human Rights Watch, Work Faster or Get Out: Labor Rights Abuses in Cambodia’s 
Garment Industry (March 18, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/11/work-faster-or-get-
out/labor-rights-abuses-cambodias-garment-industry. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Hassanien, supra note 5, at 221. 
 25. Id at 221–22. 
 26. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, To What Extent Should Egypt go Deep in its Free Trade Area 
with the United States. If Any!!, 9 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 163, 169 (2008). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Hassanien, supra note 5, at 239 
 29. Ghoneim, supra note 26, at 169. 
 30. Busse, supra note 4, at 470. 
 31. Hassanien, supra note 5, at 245. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Hassanien, supra note 5, at 242. 
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Countries in the Middle East have established further regional trade 
agreements like the Agadir Agreement and the Greater Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (GAFTA) with the general goal of reducing trade barriers in 
the region.34 As an example, the Agadir Agreement creates a free trade 
area between Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, reducing tariffs for 
goods traded between the involved nations and implementing a program 
to promote duty-free export to the European Union.35 It is unclear what 
diplomatic or peace-building effect these agreements may have had thus 
far in the region. With regional conflict still a visible issue in the Middle 
East, the United States has continued to seek a way to be a part of the 
peace-creation solution, including through its recent implementation of 
the QIZ program in Jordan and Egypt.  
A Modern Solution – Qualifying Industrial Zones 
Following the 1979 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel, the two 
countries began to explore ways to build economic cooperation in the 
region.36 Initial proposed ideas included an FTA between the countries 
and the convening of regional economic summits.37 The countries also 
tried to initiate a Middle East Development Bank but the plans for the 
bank were never solidified.38 In 1997, Jordan opened its first QIZ.39  
QIZs, a relatively new player to the game of international trade and 
regional development, are a distinct type of free trade zone. The United 
States implemented a structurally similar program when it helped devel-
op the maquiladora program in the Mexico beginning in the 1960s.40 The 
QIZ concept originated in a 1996 amendment to the United States–Israel 
free trade agreement.41 Whereas stand-alone entities within a country 
make up many free trade zones , QIZs take a more cooperative approach 
with activities relevant to the QIZ program occurring in two countries.42 
In the case of Jordan, this meant that Jordan was initially required to in-
corporate an 8% input of Israeli materials in any goods manufactured in 
  
 34. Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Abdullah Dmour, and Lana Nimri, Trends in Free Trade: Legal 
and Policy Perspectives on Jordan’s Regional Trade Arrangements, 24 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
313, 333–38 (2014). 
 35. Busse, supra note 4, at 469. 
 36. Haithum A. Haloush and Bashar H. Malkawi, The Implications of Trade Agreements 
Between  
the U.S. and Arab Countries with Particular Reference to Jordan: A Critique of the Current Legal 
Framework, 20 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 175, 177 (2008). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Bolle, supra note 3, at 4. 
 40. The maquiladora program established zones in Mexico for manufacture of products to be 
exported to the United States but was developed under different motives than those stated for QIZs. 
Maquiladoras had the general goal of creating jobs in Mexico while also reducing illegal immigra-
tion of Mexican nationals into the U.S. Bashar Malkawi, Securing Peace through Trade Dividends: 
Qualifying Industrial Zones between the U.S, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, 13 INT. TRADE L. J. 3 
(2005). 
 41. Awad, supra note 10, at 17. 
 42. Bolle, supra note 3, at 4. 
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QIZs.43 Comparatively, the content input from Jordan must be at least 
11.7%.44 Additionally, for practical reasons, Israel exports the majority 
of products originating in Jordanian QIZs from the Haifa port in Israel.  
The QIZ program is unique in that it specifically requires the in-
volvement of two nations, in this initial case Israel and Jordan, in the 
manufacture and exportation process.45 The basic concept was that Israel 
would provide textiles that would then be processed into apparel and 
related goods in factories located within Jordanian borders.46 The result-
ing products would then be destined for export to the United States 
where they would enjoy duty-free trade benefits.47 Accordingly, both 
host countries overseeing the activities in the QIZs share in the regula-
tion of the QIZs, with the United States setting conditions and authoriz-
ing tariff relief for the exports.48 This contrasts from the unilateral con-
trol over traditional free trade zones by their host countries.49 Finally, 
QIZs restrict the flow of exports exiting the zones. Within traditional free 
trade zones, the resulting products may be consumed locally or exported 
to any other country.50 QIZ exports cannot be sold domestically and, 
initially, could only be exported to the United States.51 Prohibiting do-
mestic sale of QIZ products helps protect the domestic market from un-
fair competition.52 While the initial focus of the QIZ initiative was lim-
ited to Jordan, it eventually made its way into another nation.  
QIZs Explore a New Frontier: Expanding to Egypt 
Although the United States had been encouraging Egypt to get in-
volved in the QIZ program for the better part of a decade, Egypt resisted 
until 2004, almost nine years after QIZs started popping up in Jordan.53 
One likely reason for this was that the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing was due to expire in 2005.54 
This decade-long agreement replaced the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 
that had been in place since 1974.55 The MFA placed certain restraints 
and growth quotas on the international textile and clothing industry.56 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, among other measures, limited 
the amount of certain textile products that countries could import as a 
  
 43. Nsour, supra note 34, at 342. 
 44. Awad a 4. 
 45. Id at 179–80. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Nsour, supra note 34, at 342. 
 48. Bolle, supra note 3, at 4.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Haloush, supra note 36, at 180. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id at 10. 
 54. Ghoneim, supra note 26, at 170. 
 55. WTO, Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB): The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texintro_e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015. 
 56. Id. 
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form of protecting the still growing industry.57 This Agreement was also 
written to begin a phase out of the restrictions created under the MFA.58 
Therefore, once these restrictions were lifted in 2005, Egypt was able to 
take advantage of the newly liberated textile and clothing market and 
saw benefit in incorporating QIZs into its apparel industry array. While 
the expiration of the WTO Agreement was beneficial to textile-proficient 
countries like Egypt, its expiration arguably left Jordan vulnerable as the 
previous advantages it enjoyed using QIZs to trade freely with the United 
States dissipated with the relinquishment of the international clothing 
industry.59  
Egypt’s entry into the QIZ program was necessarily distinct from 
that of Jordan. The first important distinction is that Egypt was already a 
competitive player in the textile and apparel industry.60 This means that 
the not only was Egypt already equipped with knowledge and experience 
in the clothing market but it also already had a supply of skilled labor-
ers.61 This allowed for a smoother transition into the QIZ program with-
out having to import the majority of the QIZ labor supply. Egypt’s eco-
nomic position as a previous market participant benefitted it in other 
ways. Unlike in Jordan, Egyptians own many of the companies incorpo-
rated into Egyptian QIZs.62 Additionally, Egypt is able to rely less on 
foreign textile producers as many of the textiles used in Egyptian QIZs 
are produced locally.63 The combination of these domestic advantages 
implicit in its involvement in the QIZ program allows Egypt to internal-
ize more of the economic benefits than has historically been the case in 
Jordan.  
Because of Egypt’s relative preexisting proficiency in the apparel 
industry, one may question whether different motivations than those set 
forth for the Jordanian counterpart influenced the rationale for the United 
States to bring the QIZ program to Egypt. Egypt’s QIZ program requires 
a similar amount of Israeli input (approximately 10.5%) as required for 
Jordanian QIZs.64 However, as noted, Egypt is more capable than Jordan 
of providing a significant portion of its remaining material needs.65 As 
the entry of Egypt into the QIZ program coincided with the expiration of 
the WTO Textiles and Clothing Agreement, the economic motivation for 
Egypt is relatively clear. The QIZ program allowed Egypt to shift its 
exports to the United States from non-QIZ tariff exports to QIZ tariff-
  
 57. WTO, Textiles: back in the mainstream, 
https://www.wto. org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm5_e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). 
 58. WTO, supra note 56.  
 59. Kandeel, supra note 20, at 33. 
 60. Bolle, supra note 3, at 11. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Ghoneim, supra note 26, at 170. 
 65. Bolle, supra note 3, at 11. 
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free exports.66 The migration of multiple investors in Jordanian QIZs to 
QIZ locations in Egypt supports this notion of such economic motiva-
tion.67  
Less clear is whether the stated goal of the QIZ program to bolster 
peace in the Middle East was also intended to apply to Egypt. In 1979, 
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Mu-
hammad Anwar el-Sadat participated in the Camp David Accords, lead-
ing to a peace treaty that brokered a long-needed peace between the two 
nations.68 Among other causes, land disputes had fueled conflict between 
the two nations since 1948.69 The Camp David Accords helped remedy 
this because it resulted in Israel withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula as 
well as including provisions concerning the encouragement of Palestini-
an self-government.70  
While relative peace has persisted between the nations since 1979, 
political tensions have not dissipated. Following the signing of the peace 
treaty, some Egyptian groups staged violent protests against Sadat, and in 
1981 the Egyptian President was assassinated.71 More recently, when 
mass protests called for the ouster of President Mubarak, Israeli officials 
remained supportive of the dictatorship.72 The social movements in 
Egypt over the last few decades have reflected that at least a portion of 
the Egyptian populace strongly opposes the political and economic rela-
tionship between Egypt and Israel. That being said, economically speak-
ing, the two countries have made great strides by working in unison.  
Benefitting from its sturdy footing in the apparel industry, Egypt 
took to the QIZ program with ease.73 By 2008, even though Egypt had 
fewer QIZs than Jordan and those QIZs were established almost ten 
years after Jordan’s, the number of companies represented in Egyptian 
QIZs outnumbered those in Jordan QIZs.74 Egypt quickly diversified the 
project makeup of its QIZs to be able to export electrical equipment and 
machinery as well as textiles and apparel.75 As will be discussed, the lack 
of product diversification in Jordan has likely been a cause of Jordan’s 
inability to sustain its growth in QIZ exports to the United States.76 Addi-
  
 66. Id at 10. 
 67. Haloush, supra note 36, at 185 
 68. Jimmy Carter, Camp David Accords: Egyptian-Israeli history, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/event/Camp-David-Accords (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. BBC, The assassination of Egypt’s President Sadat (Oct. 7, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-radio-and-tv-34424880. 
 72. Jean Shaoul, Israel staggered by Egypt protests, social tensions at home, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, https://www.wsws.org/en /articles/2011/02/isra-
f11.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
 73. Bolle, supra note 3, at 10.  
 74. Haloush, supra note 36, at 184. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Bolle, supra note 3, at 6. 
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tionally, the QIZ program has annually represented approximately one 
third of all of Egypt’s exports to the United States.77  
Measuring Success: Have QIZs Contributed to Peace in the Middle 
East? 
Looking to the argument that improving the economic prosperity of 
workers positively impacts human rights protections, it cannot be said 
that the prosperity of individual Jordanians has been significantly im-
proved. A key reason that corporations, whether Israeli or otherwise, 
chose to operate in Jordan is the low wage trends permeating the Jorda-
nian labor market.78 In 1997, when the first QIZ was established in Jor-
dan, the minimum hourly wage in Israel was approximately seven times 
greater than that of Jordan.79 Notably, Israeli apparel companies had al-
ready begun to move their factories to Jordan prior to the establishment 
of the first QIZ.80 The pattern of consistently low wages has led to the 
externalization of the majority of the economic benefits that QIZs sup-
ply.  
But low wages are not the only factor hampering the Jordanian 
manufacturing industries. The country must compete with well-
established apparel-producing nations like China, India, and Jordan’s 
fellow QIZ-participant, Egypt.81 Cheap labor is not powerful enough to 
out-compete countries that benefit from similar comprehensive trade 
agreements and have the advantage of having been in the business for 
decades. Further, Jordan has little practical ability to alter its competi-
tiveness.82 Lacking key material resources like a reliable source of water, 
Jordan cannot produce its own fibers and textiles to be incorporated into 
the apparel industry.83 The country must, therefore, rely on foreign inputs 
just to make the QIZ program function. Finally, while Jordanian labor 
laws do seek to favor employment of Jordanian workers, where the sup-
ply of willing Jordanian workers is low, QIZ companies must import 
labor.84 As of 2009, Jordanians represented less than a third of the QIZ 
workforce, with East Asian nations largely supplying the remainder.85 As 
unemployment in Jordan remains a problem, one would hope that Jorda-
nians represent a larger percentage of QIZ workers.86 That not being the 
  
 77. David Makovsky, Reviewing Egypt’s Gains from Its Peace Treaty with Israel, THE 
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, (2011), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/reviewing-egypts-gains-from-its-peace-
treaty-with-israel (last vistied Nov. 15, 2015). 
 78. Kandeel, supra note 20, at 30. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Haloush, supra note 36, at 185. 
 81. Awad, supra note 10, at 17. 
 82. Kandeel, supra note 20, at 32. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Awad, supra note 10, at 21. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Kandeel, supra note 20, at 32. 
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case raises questions about the effectiveness of the program to provide a 
significant economic boost to poor Jordanians. 
The question then becomes, if building the economic potential of 
poor Arab populations is a central objective in boosting the human rights 
protections and general welfare of those people, have QIZs actually con-
tributed to this objective in Jordan? If Jordanian families are unable to at 
least marginally change their economic status, there should be a reasona-
ble concern that the peace dividends formed by improving livelihoods of 
Arab nationals have not been captured. This is particularly relevant if one 
adopts the opinion that pervasive poverty has heavily contributed to the 
rises of terrorism and other forms of intrastate and interstate conflict in 
the Middle East.  
In contrast, however, Jordan, as a nation, has seen significant eco-
nomic benefits due to the QIZ program.87 Jordanian QIZs led to expo-
nential growth in Jordanian exports between 1996 and 2006.88 During 
this same time period, Jordan increased its total exports from $26 million 
to $1.5 billion and in the early 2000s Jordanian exports to the U.S. ac-
counted for more than 80% of its total exports.89 Another notable benefit 
of the QIZ program is the requirement to add 11.7% domestic value to all 
QIZ exports.90 This requirement ensures some level of input into the Jor-
danian market, even where most of the materials to be used in the QIZs 
must be imported.91 The initial impact of the QIZ program on Jordan’s 
export economy was, without a doubt, enormous.  
Around 2006, Jordanian exports to the United States began to sig-
nificantly decelerate.92 Plausible causes for this decrease in exports could 
include the impact of newly established QIZs in Egypt that served as 
competition for both Jordan’s business and its QIZ investors.93 This new 
competition between Jordan and Egypt has the potential to result in un-
wanted tension between the countries that is contrary to the peace-
building objectives of the QIZ program.94 But Congress appears to 
blame, instead, Jordan’s failures at improving its economic capacity dur-
ing the first ten years of the QIZ program for this drop-off in exports.95 A 
2013 report from the Congressional Research Service argues that Jordan 
would have been able to sustain its QIZ-related economic growth had it 
diversified its exports beyond apparel, jewelry, and a few other products; 
transitioned from labor-intensive exports to higher and more complex 
  
 87. Bolle, supra note 3, at 6. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Awad, supra note 10, at 23. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Busse, supra note 4, at 471. 
 93. Bolle, supra note 3, at 11.  
 94. Awad, supra note 10, at 17. 
 95. Bolle, supra note 3, at 6. 
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value-added products; absorbed new technology; created domestic link-
ages to production supplies; or upgraded the skill of its workers.96 Un-
clear in the report is whether Jordan had the resources to make any of 
these changes, which would presumably be both temporally and finan-
cially demanding.  
Despite the drop-off in exports to the United States, Jordan’s new 
economic relationship with the United States led to much more substan-
tial gains. The two countries established an FTA in 2000 that went into 
effect in 2001.97 Because the FTA sought to eliminate tariffs on all goods 
except tobacco, the $900 million in exports that Jordan completed with 
the United States in 2009 was 15 times as much as the revenue gained 
from exports in 2000 prior to the signing of the FTA.98 Importantly, this 
FTA had specific tariff protections for the textile sector, indicating the 
United States’ desire to protect the QIZ program.99 However, this may 
also be read to be a protection for Israeli textile manufacturers that Jor-
dan may not continue to buy from were it not for the Israeli-content re-
quirements for QIZs.100 QIZ investors have voiced their preference for 
the FTA benefits because the FTA allows for more diversification of 
imports and exports and removes the costs associated with the required 
and often expensive Israel content input.101 Additionally, as Jordan’s QIZ 
benefits were slowing, it continued to export more and more to the rest of 
the world, accomplishing $8 billion in exports in 2011.102  
Where Jordan’s exports to the U.S. remained narrow in product 
type, it greatly diversified its exports to other countries.103 Importantly, 
Jordan and Israel expanded their trade relationship in 2004 when they 
signed a new trade agreement, removing many of the remaining trade 
barriers between the nations and greatly increasing the percentage of 
products that could be exported duty-free from Jordan to Israel.104 Israeli 
and Jordanian trade officials concurred that the agreement could act as a 
model for the region and would encourage peaceful relations between 
Israel and other Arab countries.105 As of 2013, Jordan’s leading trade 
partners included Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq.106 
The significant growth of trade relations with other Arab countries is an 
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encouraging sign that the QIZ program helped encourage Jordan to es-
tablish and maintain regional trade relationships. Jordan has also been 
able to steadily increase its annual imports of a variety of goods includ-
ing vehicles, cereals, and mechanical appliances.107 Further, Jordan has 
expanded its involvement in bilateral economic-cooperation agreements 
and, in 2005, became the first country in the region to sign an FTA with 
Singapore, a known world trade power.108 
The QIZ program contributed almost exclusively to its United 
States export program for the first ten years after the initiation of the 
program.109 During this period Jordan liberalized trade with many other 
regional and distant nations, including the important establishment of an 
FTA with the United States. The QIZ program has been shown to have 
contributed significantly to the expansion of Jordan’s national export 
regime.110 It is arguable, therefore, that the QIZ program acted as a cata-
lyst to Jordan’s economic growth and helped the country establish itself 
as a significant trade power in the Middle East. If we agree with Halabi 
that building relationships with Israel and other Arab nations in the name 
of economic prosperity is key to encouraging peaceful relations, then the 
QIZ program can be seen as having contributed to Jordanian peace. 
While Egypt’s QIZs benefit from the country’s experience and 
competitive advantage in the apparel industry, there is some evidence 
indicating that Jordan has firmer political standing than Egypt. Im-
portantly, Jordan got a head start by implementing the QIZ program 
nearly a decade before Egypt.111 Even with Egypt’s relative expertise in 
the garment-industry and the choice of some QIZ investors to move to 
Egypt from Jordan, Jordan was able to reap political benefits from initiat-
ing the multilateral relationship with Israel and the United States in 
1996.112 Since the conception of the Jordanian QIZ program, Jordan has 
established FTAs with the United States, Singapore, and other Middle 
Eastern countries.113 Therefore, even if Jordan’s QIZ program were to 
continue to lose steam over the next several years, it would have protec-
tive FTAs to fall back on.114 In contrast, Egypt has failed to secure an 
FTA with the United States, leaving it vulnerable to the uncertain success 
of its QIZ growth and other export opportunities.115 Alternatively, it can 
be argued that an FTA between the United States and Egypt may be eco-
nomically unnecessary given the current state of trade between the coun-
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tries.116 Combining the benefits of QIZs for the garment industry with the 
trade protections in place for other Egyptian products like oil, which en-
joys duty-free import into the United States, and food products and furni-
ture, which enter the United States duty-free under the Generalized Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP), an FTA may not add significant economic 
benefit.117 Still, the political benefits of signing an FTA with the United 
States could ultimately outweigh these economic arguments, particularly 
when considering the uncertain state of Egypt’s diplomatic relationship 
with Israel.118 
A further complication for Egypt is the procedural obstacles to es-
tablishing QIZs in the country. Egypt is notorious for having a long, 
complicated, and expensive approval process for construction permits, 
which is unattractive to foreign investors.119 Interviewed QIZ investors 
have indicated that Jordan QIZs may be a preferable long-term invest-
ment because Jordan is currently more secure and politically stable and 
maintains a more flexible and laid back business environment.120 This is 
particularly significant when comparing Jordan to Egypt, where political 
tensions remain high, leaving the wisdom of establishing new QIZs in 
Egypt uncertain. 
Political Implications of Economic Development in the Middle East 
Some commentators on conflict in the Middle East have argued that 
building economic interdependence in the Middle East is the best way to 
improve normalization of regional relationships and enhance political 
stability.121 A natural result of this stability would be economic diversity, 
growth, and market confidence that would, in turn, promote peace.122 
The daily performance of the QIZ program requires contact between 
professionals in both Israel and the QIZ host country, which could slowly 
garner and normalize the political relationship between the two coun-
tries.123 These necessary interactions force market transparency between 
the nations, helping them to build trust and forgive past political mis-
chief.124  
Israel has been notorious for impacting and upsetting neighboring 
Arab nations through its historical aggressive nature when it comes to 
involvement in regional disputes.125 Accordingly, finding a way to get 
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Israel economically engaged with neighboring Arab countries could be a 
significant step towards the normalization of political interactions be-
tween Israel and countries feeling threatened by it.126 The 2004 trade 
agreement between Israel and Jordan, while lauded by Jordanian and 
Israeli officials, was vigorously protested in Jordan.127 As has been a 
concern among some Egyptians, Islamic politicians and other activists in 
Jordan have often voiced opposition to dealings with Israel.128 The ques-
tion, then, is whether the trade relationships between Israel and neighbor-
ing countries are influential enough promote regional peace rather than 
spark further conflict. The United States has played a central, while 
somewhat controversial, role in peace creation in the Middle East during 
the last several decades. As the United States has already engaged with 
Israel and many Arab nations, one can reasonably argue that when the 
United States maintains good economic relationships with these coun-
tries, it has more leverage to push for peaceful interactions between 
them.129  
Still, other experts opine that political stability must be established 
before economic stability can be achieved.130 For example, Israel’s re-
cent history with Palestine is relevant for the Israeli-Jordanian economic 
relationship.131 In 2000, Israel had to abandon plans for a joint Israeli-
Palestinian industrial zone in the Gaza Strip because of a Palestinian 
uprising in the area.132 There are further concerns that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict will cause significant obstacles and delays for trans-
porters of QIZ products.133 The heightened state of security in Israel may 
require slower travel through conflict areas and more stringent inspec-
tions of QIZ goods, both of which would raise the cost of trade.134 Thus, 
it may be that the peace benefits of the Israeli-Jordanian partnership may 
not extend to improve the political climate surrounding Israel’s disputes 
with Palestine.  
CONCLUSION  
The QIZ program is unique for its limited geographical application, 
requirements for regional input in the manufacturing process, and overall 
objective of providing peace dividends for countries that have a persis-
tent history of political instability. The program has now been running 
for nearly twenty years, which reveals the varied benefits and detriments 
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that QIZs have had on Jordan, Egypt, and Israel. Because Egypt only 
joined the QIZ game about a decade ago, its role in the evolution of this 
tool for regional trade is likely still unfolding. The economic impacts of 
QIZs have been generally positive, but the ability of these free trade 
zones to dampen political tensions both with Israel and throughout the 
region is unclear. There is evidence that increased commercial interac-
tions between Israel and QIZ host nations helps to normalize the political 
relationships between these countries. However, particularly in the case 
of Egypt, internal political strife continues to hamper the establishment 
of regional peace. Nonetheless, if Jordan’s involvement in the QIZ pro-
gram resulted in improved cooperation with Israel and Jordan’s estab-
lishment of notable FTAs , there may still be hope that QIZs can broaden 
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